Nothing substantive will change as longas we have an autocratic regualtory system which knows it will be judged on its ability to prevent a release no matter what the preamble of the AEA says or pious NEIMA and ADVANCE Act statements. Nuclear's cost will remain 5 or more times above what it should cost. The NRC is in its present form cannot be reformed. We must totally rethink how we regulate nuclear power. The GKG proposes the Nuclear Reorganization Act.
“Multi‑criteria decision frameworks, long used in other high‑consequence public sectors, are designed for exactly this class of problem” l would appreciate some examples of these frameworks, and/or references. Thanks
the statutory obligation to consider benefits from energy and regulatory efficiency is appropriate top level guidance from congress, though a proper Doge whacking would likely develop a functioning fission coordinating agency faster. the proposed architecture change to separate non‑negotiable thresholds—safety, security, legal compliance—from compensatory trade‑offs, and then evaluate policy options explicitly across multiple objectives is one approach that arguably could prompt agency operation efficiency. however this change immediately inherently poses the issue of safety and security thresholds and standards which would have to go way way way down to reach the level of being non-negotiable. Standards have to be engineered, which brings in the systems engineering framework among the practitioners and their corporate and agency orgs. this wide terrain of reorganizing the NRC could make more visible the safety and security issues and paradigms. insiders charge on! free the slothful safety mongers from their procedure trap
any minimizing of the scope of this reform task would be the same naivete as thinking a statutory statement on its own can change operation, and a bureaucratic maneuver of stalling.
whether the architecture of a separate agency for regulation can achieve broader consideration is questionable, only efforts will tell. it was set up in 1974 expressly to partition the integrated mission of the AEC of 1954 and suppress fission electric plant construction, which it initiated with regulatory capture centered on lucrative safety retrofits crowding out new construction.
thanks to DJT's climate moonshot the pacing item now is design and build of many large and small vessel plants affordably. the captured NRC is a dog biting the ankles of the builders, only one part of a much larger challenge, to develop capacity of energy and utility agencies and nuclear integrator corporations to engineer and integrate a lower cost construction system. Japan and Korea can help with that, or become captured themselves. a smart NRC would find ways to engage and learn from the technical expansion and become a team player supporting outcome. if it cant get undumb then safety and security need to move into the DOE divisions that are pushing forward fissionelectric development and construction.
Nothing substantive will change as longas we have an autocratic regualtory system which knows it will be judged on its ability to prevent a release no matter what the preamble of the AEA says or pious NEIMA and ADVANCE Act statements. Nuclear's cost will remain 5 or more times above what it should cost. The NRC is in its present form cannot be reformed. We must totally rethink how we regulate nuclear power. The GKG proposes the Nuclear Reorganization Act.
https://gordianknotbook.com/download/underwriter-certification-of-nuclear-power/
“Multi‑criteria decision frameworks, long used in other high‑consequence public sectors, are designed for exactly this class of problem” l would appreciate some examples of these frameworks, and/or references. Thanks
The insurance market.
the statutory obligation to consider benefits from energy and regulatory efficiency is appropriate top level guidance from congress, though a proper Doge whacking would likely develop a functioning fission coordinating agency faster. the proposed architecture change to separate non‑negotiable thresholds—safety, security, legal compliance—from compensatory trade‑offs, and then evaluate policy options explicitly across multiple objectives is one approach that arguably could prompt agency operation efficiency. however this change immediately inherently poses the issue of safety and security thresholds and standards which would have to go way way way down to reach the level of being non-negotiable. Standards have to be engineered, which brings in the systems engineering framework among the practitioners and their corporate and agency orgs. this wide terrain of reorganizing the NRC could make more visible the safety and security issues and paradigms. insiders charge on! free the slothful safety mongers from their procedure trap
any minimizing of the scope of this reform task would be the same naivete as thinking a statutory statement on its own can change operation, and a bureaucratic maneuver of stalling.
whether the architecture of a separate agency for regulation can achieve broader consideration is questionable, only efforts will tell. it was set up in 1974 expressly to partition the integrated mission of the AEC of 1954 and suppress fission electric plant construction, which it initiated with regulatory capture centered on lucrative safety retrofits crowding out new construction.
thanks to DJT's climate moonshot the pacing item now is design and build of many large and small vessel plants affordably. the captured NRC is a dog biting the ankles of the builders, only one part of a much larger challenge, to develop capacity of energy and utility agencies and nuclear integrator corporations to engineer and integrate a lower cost construction system. Japan and Korea can help with that, or become captured themselves. a smart NRC would find ways to engage and learn from the technical expansion and become a team player supporting outcome. if it cant get undumb then safety and security need to move into the DOE divisions that are pushing forward fissionelectric development and construction.